In the last thirty years a view of embodied consciousness has emerged that challenges us to rethink completely the traditional views of personhood. Beginning, perhaps, with Benjamin Libet’s experiments and the Color Phi study, and continuing in the philosophical work of Daniel Dennett and others, as well as research into memetics, this view argues in effect that we have no central consciousness, no “I” that controls our thinking and feeling, but instead we consist of <em>stories all the way down</em>. This has powerful consequences for our lives, our sense of community, and our digital tools that need spelling out and investigating.
For many reasons this view has remained largely hidden. Certainly it has barely informed arts, culture or politics. This theme will investigate this view and its consequences. I have begun a research area for students at Arcada which will allow them to investigate different aspects of consciousness and personhood, as thesis topics. I will also draw together strands of my own research with a view to publishing a book and organising a conference.